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The implicit social contract underpinning healthcare is that it
will reduce illness and preventable death and improve quality
of life. But sometimes these promises are not delivered.
Sometimes health services take people who don’t need
intervention, subject them to tests, label them as sick or at risk,
provide unnecessary treatments, tell them to live differently, or
insist on monitoring them regularly.1 These interventions don’t
improve things for people; they produce complications or illness,
reduce quality of life, or even cause premature death. Active
health intervention is not always a good thing: it can be “too
much medicine,” or produce what is often called overdiagnosis.
Although the concept of overdiagnosis has been described in
the literature for nearly 50 years in relation to cancer
screening,2 3 it was Welch and colleagues’ 2011 book,
Overdiagnosed: Making People Sick in the Pursuit of Health,
that popularised the term.4
Overdiagnosis is now an acknowledged problem for patients,
clinicians, researchers, and policymakers; it is discussed in
journals5-7 and at specialist conferences8 and addressed through
policy and practice initiatives.9-11 There is, however, no formal,
agreed definition of overdiagnosis. Rather, the word has become
a banner under which disparate people with similar general
concerns can unite. This vagueness and breadth allows the
appearance of unity but does not serve the more exacting
demands of research and healthcare. Here we examine the
meanings of overdiagnosis more closely and discuss related
challenges for healthcare professionals, patients, and researchers.
If overdiagnosis is to be understood and mitigated, the broad
concept should be subdivided into different problems and its
ethical dimensions better acknowledged.
Towards a definition
Overlapping concepts
Aspects of overdiagnosis overlap with existing movements in
health policy and practice10 such as evidence based medicine,
patient centred care,12 strategies for disinvestment,13 and quality
and safety in healthcare, especially preventing iatrogenic illness
and low value healthcare.14 A careful comparison with these
better defined problems will allow those concerned about
overdiagnosis to learn from related work, avoid redundant work,
and better identify what is unique about overdiagnosis.
Social and ethical dimensions of
overdiagnosis
A deeper understanding of overdiagnosis requires moral as well
as technical analysis. It is tempting to seek a purely technical
definition of overdiagnosis that excludes context, values, and
ethics. But the much debated balance of benefit and harm central
to the concept of overdiagnosis is also central to healthcare
ethics. Technical definitions of overdiagnosis quickly confront
moral considerations, such as what types of benefit or harm
should matter 15; how different benefits and harms, or benefits
and harms to different people, should be weighted; whether
benefits and harms should bemeasured in individuals or systems
and society; and who should judge which benefits and harms
matter.16 For example, the harms of overdiagnosis are often side
effects of treatment. But which side effects are important enough
to include in any measurement of harm? Are some side effects
more important than others? Who should decide—patients,
clinicians, or researchers? And what if they disagree?
To understand, define, and respond to overdiagnosis, we also
need to understand complex healthcare systems and the people
who use and serve them. Hoffman and Kanzaria argue that
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overtesting and overtreatment will continue until doctors,
patients, and society learn to accept the uncertainty inherent in
the practice of medicine.17 Clinicians attempting to help their
patients in a system loadedwith incentives and penalties, citizens
trying to comply with health advice, companies required to
deliver profits, defensive medicolegal systems, the rise of over
the counter and internet enabled self testing, and bureaucratic
key performance indicators are all features in the landscape of
overdiagnosis.
Multiple related concepts
The table⇓ sets out an inclusive map of concepts related to the
problems of overdiagnosis or toomuchmedicine. Each concept
is contestable; we provide rough rather than authoritative
definitions. As illustrated, these concepts are interrelated. For
example, overdetection and overdiagnosis are drivers of
overtreatment and overutilisation. Disease mongering probably
leads to overdiagnosis. Overmedicalisation permits or
encourages disease mongering, overtreatment, and
overutilisation.
The concepts in the table range from broad to narrow. The
broadest is arguably overmedicalisation—for example,
defaulting to biotechnological responses rather than existential
wisdom to deal with our fear of death1 or defining disruptive
behaviour in children as a medical problem requiring drug
treatment when social or behavioural interventions may be
equally effective with a lower probability of harm.22 These are
cultural problems, connected to profound questions about what
constitutes a good human life. Other overdiagnosis problems
are far narrower and more instrumental—for example, how
mammography services can minimise the number of women
experiencing both late stage breast cancer and unnecessary
treatment of early stage breast cancer.23 The narrowest concepts
in the table are arguably overdetection and overdiagnosis. The
narrower the concern, the more concrete and individually
focused it is, and the more amenable to quantitative
measurement.
This leads us to our central observation. The word overdiagnosis
is being used in two ways. It is used as the umbrella term for
most of the concepts in the table, but it is also used to label one
narrow concept in the set. Using the word overdiagnosis in both
the broad and the narrow sense is imprecise for researchers and
clinicians and potentially confusing for the public and decision
makers.We suggest it should stop. If concerned parties continue
to use the word overdiagnosis to mean several different things
at different levels of generality,24 they are likely to talk past one
another or waste energy on unnecessary disagreement. Instead,
a new umbrella term (such as too much medicine5 or less is
more medicine10 25) could be used for the broad conception
summarised at the beginning of this article. Adopting a new
umbrella term would spare the word overdiagnosis for the
narrower, more precise, meaning.
Such a change could help resolve some disagreement over the
extent and scope of the concept. Issues such as overtreatment,
overutilisation, overmedicalisation, and disease mongering
cannot be readily shoehorned into a narrow definition of
overdiagnosis but fit easily into the broad set of too much
medicine. Debate over the narrow concept of overdiagnosis
could then be restricted to a few central concerns (box 1), such
as whether it occurs in symptomatic, or only asymptomatic,
people and the relations between overdiagnosis, risk factors,
and false positive findings.
Precise definition for specific purposes
Broader and narrower conceptions of overdiagnosis are suited
to different purposes. Different interested parties are working
with different implicit understandings of the concept. They are
focused on different conditions and problems (mental health,
cancer screening, drug promotions, etc) and have different
purposes: unpacking the logical structure of overdiagnosis,
explaining how it occurs, measuring it, advocating for political
change, or developing practical tools to change clinical or policy
practice.
Each of these purposes is important, but they occur at different
levels of generality. Advocacy, for example, can employ the
broadest conception. It is here that a new umbrella term such
as too much medicine may be most helpful because it is
arresting, inclusive, and easy to understand. In contrast,
epidemiological measurement of overdiagnosis requires greater
precision and encodes multiple assumptions specific to each
condition studied. Methods for measuring overdiagnosis in a
particular condition, along with the assumptions underpinning
these methods, implicitly define overdiagnosis in that condition.
These methods and assumptions will change disease by disease,
test by test.
For all conditions, measuring overdiagnosis requires good
quality, large scale data collection over time, and an international
effort to agree on appropriate analysis methods for that
condition. This agreement has proved difficult. More work has
been done on methods for estimating overdiagnosis in cancer
screening than in any other condition, but still there is deep
disagreement about appropriatemethods, and all current methods
carry considerable risk of bias.28 This process needs to be
repeated for other conditions, because in each condition the
drivers of overdiagnosis and potential sources of bias differ.
For example, overdiagnosis of breast, prostate, thyroid, and
lung cancer is driven largely by screening and early detection
programmes,29 so potential biases include lead time; confounders
include population trends in cancer risk factors such as use of
hormone therapy, bodyweight, and smoking. In contrast, the
drivers of overdiagnosis in high blood pressure, high cholesterol,
and diabetes include more frequent testing and regular changes
in the thresholds for what is considered abnormal (the threshold
for high blood pressure, for example, has fallen from 160/100
mmHg to 140/90 mmHg). Rather than responding to lead time,
methods for estimating overdiagnosis in these conditions must
respond to threshold changes, but it is not yet clear how this
should be done. For each condition the pattern repeats: different
drivers, different biases, and so different methods.
Beyond advocacy and epidemiology, others are examining
overdiagnosis for different purposes. Social scientists are
studying how clinicians, decision makers, patients, and citizens
make sense of overdiagnosis and too much medicine.16 30 For
example, some of us are studying general practitioners’
understanding and management of overdiagnosis in prostate
cancer in Australia and the UK and Australian decision makers’
understanding of overdiagnosis in mammography; we are
mapping the diversity of what overdiagnosis means to different
stakeholders and the deeply held values that support their
understandings.31These are conceptualisations based in everyday
practice and will inform the policy response to the problem. At
a more abstract level, scholars in the philosophy of medicine
are studying the logical structure of overdiagnosis, developing
precise formal definitions and typologies and sound arguments
on questions such as whether overdiagnoses, false positive
results, and misdiagnoses intersect or are mutually
exclusive.16 24 32
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Box 1: Classic overdiagnosis, narrowly conceived, precise, and condition specific
Thyroid cancer provides a useful example of the narrow sense of overdiagnosis26 27 In the US, the rate of diagnosis of thyroid cancer has
tripled over the past 30 years, from 3.6 cases/100 000 in 1973 to 11.6 cases/100 000 in 2009, with most of the extra diagnoses being of
papillary cancer. This rise in thyroid cancer diagnosis has been linked to the increased use of portable ultrasound machines for screening
asymptomatic people. Before ultrasonography was available lesions were identified by clinical examination, usually when patients presented
with symptoms. Now lesions as small as 2 mm can be identified and biopsied. If malignant cells are found, patients are offered thyroidectomy,
the rates of which in the US have increased by 60% over the past 10 years. Despite the rise in diagnoses and treatment, the death rate from
thyroid cancer has remained stable.26 This suggests that the extra diagnoses and treatments are not reducing morbidity or mortality.
To tackle this example of overdiagnosis we need to understand the natural course of these very small lesions, which may grow too slowly
to become symptomatic during the person’s lifetime. Are they one end of a spectrum of tumour behaviour ranging from indolent to aggressive,
and if so, can we identify which will remain indolent? Or are they a separate pathological phenomenon?What are the relevant histopathological
and genomic features that might answer these questions?
Meanwhile, on the front line of medicine and public health,
strategies are being developed to decrease both too much
medicine and specific cases of overdiagnosis. Different
groups—general practitioners, clinical specialists, policymakers,
citizens, and patients—face different challenges. For those on
the front line, the most important step may be accepting the
unsettling general sense of too much medicine: that medicine
is an uncertain practice, that healthcare may be harmful, and
that attending to harms is as important as attending to benefits.
Such a cultural shift will make it easier to translate the precise
work done by researchers on specific cases of overdiagnosis.
Such translation has begun, facilitated by professional
organisations and consumer groups including Consumer
Reports,33 the Academy of Royal Medical Colleges,34 the
American Board of InternalMedicine Foundation,14 the National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence,35 and the Royal College
of General Practitioners.11
From here
We may never agree on a single definition of overdiagnosis.
But we can and should be more explicit about what we mean
when we use the term, including the breadth or precision,
relevant conditions, assumptions regarding benefit and harm,
and purpose (box 2). Clarifying these dimensions will serve our
ultimate goal of getting a better grasp on the important problem
of too much medicine.
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Box 2: Actions to clarify overdiagnosis and too much medicine
• Recognise that both overdiagnosis (narrow) and too much medicine (broad) are social and ethical problems, not just technical and
scientific problems
• Stop using the word overdiagnosis to refer to the broad too much medicine problem
• Recognise the need to respond to overdiagnosis specialty by specialty and condition by condition
• Develop a clear definition of too much medicine for use in public and political communication
• Engage with others working in closely related movements, such as low value care and patient centred care, and systematically study
the similarities and differences
• Recognise the potentially competing values at stake in defining and tackling overdiagnosis and too much medicine and develop
inclusive strategies to take full account of these
• Promote public debate on the inherent uncertainty and limitations of healthcare and their implications for overdiagnosis and too much
medicine
Table
Table 1| Concepts related to too much medicine or “less is more medicine,” possible drivers, reasons for lack of net benefit, and examples
Inter-relation with other
concepts
Examples (all assume
no net benefit)
Reasons for harm, or lack
of net benefitDriversMeaningConcept
Overdetection often leads
to overdiagnosis, which in
turn leads to overtreatment
and overutilisation.
Overdiagnosis can be
difficult to distinguish from
Non-progressive breast
cancer detected through
population
mammographic
screening.
High blood pressure
diagnosed in
Non-medical care is more
effective or beneficial.
Disease is indolent,
inconsequential, or will
regress.
Treatment produces no
benefit or more harm than
benefit (eg, side effects).
Labelling causes
psychological or social
harms.
Intergenerational effects of
parental diagnosis lead to
“at risk” offspring
Disease mongering (see
definition below).
Expanding disease
definitions by lowering
thresholds for what is
considered abnormal.
Early detection programmes
(screening).
Defensive medicine.
Guidelines or incentives that
encourage testing
An (asymptomatic) person
is diagnosed with a
condition; that diagnosis
does not produce a net
benefit for that person
Overdiagnosis (in
the narrow sense)
misdiagnosis and false
positive results.
Expanded definitions,
disease mongering and
overmedicalisation likely to
increase overdiagnosis
asymptomatic people
because of lowered
thresholds for diagnosis
Overdetection may lead to
overdiagnosis,
overtreatment, and
overutilisation.
Expanded definitions,
disease mongering, and
Incidentalomas.18
PSA testing in
asymptomatic men.
Detection of
sub-segmental pulmonary
embolism
Finding indicates something
that is indolent,
inconsequential, or would
have regressed.
Labelling causes
psychological or social
harms.
Intergenerational effects of
parental diagnosis leading
to “at risk” offspring
Disease mongering.
Expanding disease
definitions.
Encouraging well people to
be tested.
Development of increasingly
sensitive testing technologies
(eg 3D digital
mammography).
Cultural norms about
prevention (eg “an ounce of
A health related finding is
detected in an
(asymptomatic) person,
probably by testing
technology. That finding
does not produce a net
benefit for that person
Overdetection
overmedicalisation likely to
increase overdetection.
Overdetection can be
difficult to distinguish from
false positive result
prevention is worth a pound
of cure”).
Overuse of expensive testing
technologies to justify their
expense.
Defensive medicine.
Guidelines or incentives that
encourage testing.
Direct to consumer testing
(eg internet-enabled genetic
testing)
False positives can be
difficult to distinguish from
overdetection and
overdiagnosis. If it becomes
a working diagnosis a false
positive result can cause
Recall after cancer
screening, with negative
result on retest
Person wrongly informed
that they do, or may, have
the condition or risk factor.
This can cause
psychological or social
harm and result in further
The rate of false positives is
a characteristic of the test
technology and dependent
on our biological and
technical knowledge. The
boundary between a true
Classically: a test indicates
that a condition is present,
when in fact it is not. In
practice: there is often a
“grey zone” between normal
and abnormal tissue or
False positive
overtreatment andunnecessary testing,
especially if invasive
positive, a false positive, and
an overdiagnosis (in the
function, and in this zone it
is not always possible to overutilisation (unnecessary
follow-up tests)narrow sense) is always setdistinguish false positive
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Table 1 (continued)
Inter-relation with other
concepts
Examples (all assume
no net benefit)
Reasons for harm, or lack
of net benefitDriversMeaningConcept
results from overdiagnosis
in the narrow sense
by relevant experts (eg,
pathologists)
May lead to overtreatment
or overutilisation.
Disease mongering may
increase misdiagnosis
Patients with fever from
other causes have
malaria diagnosed.
Patients with infective
cough diagnosed with
asthma
Wrong treatment.
Concurrent neglect or
undertreatment of
underlying disease
Fear of missing a serious
diagnosis.
Lack of diagnostic specificity.
Limited diagnostic resources
Incorrect diagnosis of a
symptomatic person with a
condition they do not have
Misdiagnosis
Overdiagnosis,
overdetection,
misdiagnosis, expanded
definitions, disease
mongering, and
overmedicalisation tend to
lead to overtreatment.
Overtreatment is a form of
overutilisation
Broad spectrum antibiotic
use in viral infection.
Antidepressants when
non-drug therapies would
be equally or more
effective.
Proposals for mass
medication—for example,
to treat all adults with a
polypill or statins
Treatment produces no net
benefit or more harm than
benefit (eg, side effects20)
Defensive practice.
Guideline driven care
Tendency to treat rather than
to watch and wait
Provision of treatment with
no net benefit by individual
clinicians to their patients
Overtreatment
All of the other concepts in
this table are likely to
produce overutilisation of
certain services
Routine MRI for lower
back pain.
Call-recall systems to
encourage all patients to
attend for an annual
pelvic examination and
cervical smear
In individuals, harms of
overdetection,
overdiagnosis,
overtreatment,
misdiagnosis.
In systems, opportunity
costs and economic costs20
Expanded definitions.
Disease mongering.
Guideline driven care.
Expensive diagnostic
equipment requiring high
usage to justify expense
Establishment of standard
practice in health services
or systems that do not
provide net benefit to
patients or citizens
Overutilisation
May encourage
overmedicalisation.
Likely to increase
overdiagnosis,
overdetection,
overtreatment, and
overutilisation
Expanding pre-diabetic
so previously normal
people are labelled
prediabetic.
Labelling low libido in
women as female sexual
dysfunction
More people labelled as
diseased, pre-diseased, or
at risk—labelling
psychologically or socially
harmful.
Treatment of newly
diagnosed people produces
Overmedicalisation
Expert committees tend to
expand disease categories.
Profit motivated industries
benefit economically as more
people are diagnosed and
treated
Expansion of official
disease or risk categories,
or creating new conditions,
or promoting more frequent
diagnosis of recognised
conditions, without net
benefit to patients or
citizens.21 Creating
Expanded
definitions or
disease mongering
no benefit or more harm
“diseases” out of behaviour than benefit (eg, side
effects)or feelings that are within
normal human experience,
and promoting those
diseases to the public to
encourage use of health
services, especially tests
and medicines
Overlaps with all other
concepts in table.
Extremely broad: occurs
well beyond overdiagnosis
in the narrow sense
Fear of death treated as
something that can be
fixed with biotechnology
rather than something
requiring existential
wisdom.20
Disruptive children
treated with drugs
Provides an environment
conducive to expanded
definitions, disease
mongering, overdetection,
overdiagnosis,
overtreatment, and overuse
All other concepts in table will
drive overmedicalisation; the
converse also seems likely
Altering the meaning or
understanding of
experiences, so that human
problems are re-interpreted
as medical problems
requiring medical treatment,
without net benefit to
patients or citizens
Overmedicalisation
Readers are likely to experience at least one of the following reactions. “But that’s a driver of overdiagnosis” (overdetection, expanded definitions, disease mongering,
overmedicalisation), “But that’s a consequence of overdiagnosis” (overtreatment, overutilisation, overmedicalisation), “But that’s caused by so many things other
than overdiagnosis” (overtreatment, overutilisation.) “But that is, by definition, not overdiagnosis” (misdiagnosis, false positives). This is precisely our point. A term
such as “too much medicine” or “less is more medicine” should be adopted as the umbrella term. This would readily accommodate everything in this table. Then
disagreement would be limited to the much more fruitful question of how to define overdiagnosis in the narrow sense (that is, how to determine what belongs in
the first row of this table).
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